The Bothy Band 1976 – godlike

Gods and goddesses do not care about our petty problems of life and death and suffering.  Rather, they unleash joy and terror at their own whim.

Atheism in Egypt

Did anyone expect this?

  Juan Cole reports:  

 Egyptian journalist Hilmy al-Namnam said last fall that some researchers had concluded that there were 2 million Egyptian atheists. He blamed the rapid increase in unbelief among young people on the period of Muslim Brotherhood rule and the hypocrisy of television preachers. Educated young women are especially dismayed at the discourse on women apparent in clerical sermons. [Quoting Hilmy al-Namnam:]

Apparently it was the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood [June 2012-July 2013] that caused these groups of young people to pop up and which increased their numbers. It was suggested that I meet with a number of them last April, and I heard then from a young woman who says that she forsook religion, and when I discussed with them I did not find exactly what you could call a atheism, but a great deal of anger and protest at prevailing actions and behavior, and even many believers will share their anger and protest at the glaring contradiction between words and deeds of some of the preachers on television.”

A classic courtly love sentiment from Cadenet

Provided that her great virtue increases,
and is heard about,
it doesn't matter to her if I find myself afflicted,
nor how my affairs go.
For it is good for her that I bear all the suffering,
and I like when I can put her forth;
it is good for her when she can make me languish
and I like when I can advance her;
she doesn't care that I feel bad,
and I like it when she feels good.

More from Cadenet

The thing I would  be,
if I had such faculty,
would be such
as has power.
For I'd be nicely provided
with weapons and clothing,
I'd be generous with guests,
I'd be sumptuous in court,
I'd want to see ladies,
give gifts often,
follow wars and tournaments,
and take pleasure in courting.

And this, it seems to me, would be virtue
more than rapine
of which are fond
all our barons;
for if you are richer
than others, and so are your people,
they'll prepare riders
with light equipment
to snatch the loot more easily,
or, if they are met with force,
to flee more easily; it'd seem to me
that this debases and discredits them.

There was a time when one recognized
lovers, when he saw them,
by their great expenses
and by the many beautiful gifts
and by the pleasant apparels
and by the beautiful receptions.
But, today, it's the smooth talkers,
for riches corrupt all good qualities;
but through ingenuity or through learning
one can't keep his virtue
unless one establishes or enhances it through [his] actions:
such is the way these things go.

No man loses himself
through courtesy.
And there was a time
when one was in love
and youth showed
and congeniality reigned.
But now he who first goes
get the oxen and the cattlemen
is thought of as the most valiant.
You, see if they tell the truth,
those who, thanks to these same earnings,
show themselves in disgraceful attire.

The American Tributary System, by Yuen Foong Khong

From the Chinese Journal of International Politics (paywall):

America has more in common with China than is generally recognized. In this article, I employ the idea of the tributary system—most often associated with China’s international relations from antiquity—to interpret how America relates to the rest of the world (ROW). I argue that the United States has instituted the most successful tributary system the world has ever seen. As the hub or epicenter of the most extensive network of formal and informal alliances ever built, the United States offers its allies and partners—or tributaries—military protection as well as economic access to its markets.1 Through an equally impressive array of international institutions and organizations, many of which it created, the United States transmits and imposes its values and its preferred rules of the game on the international system. The ensuing economic and politico-military ‘orders’ are construed as ‘public goods’ provided by a benign American hegemony. In return for all its exertions, the tribute America seeks is straightforward: first, that it be recognized as the power or hegemon, and second, that others emulate its political forms and ideas. With both tributes in hand, the United States finds equanimity; it and the world are safe, at least from the United States’ point of view.

I elaborate on these arguments below and provide preliminary evidence in support of them. We begin with a discussion and critique of some of the most influential contemporary interpretations of America as an international actor, focusing on accounts of the US empire, the United States as the unipolar power, and as the chief patron of a system of client states. I suggest that while these accounts illuminate important aspects of the US–ROW relationship, they fail to emphasize the payback the United States wants in return for its exertions as the hegemon. This paves the way for introducing the idea of the tributary system, which takes hierarchy as its point of departure, but which emphasizes two insights not found in the existing accounts: the United States’ desire for recognition (by its tributaries) that it is the number one power, and for them (the tributaries) to adopt (US-style) liberal democratic norms and institutions. A discussion of the Chinese tributary system follows, focusing on six of its key characteristics. I then demonstrate how each of these features has parallels in America’s approach to world since 1898. Differences between the Chinese tributary system and that of the United States will also be discussed. The article concludes by spelling out the empirical/theoretical payoffs and implications of viewing US–ROW relations through the tributary lens.
...




The novelty of the tributary framework does not rest on the contention about American hegemony, a point that many international relations scholars accept. The novelty of the tributary concept resides elsewhere. First, its normative take on hegemony: it casts hegemony in a less positive light, emphasizing the hierarchical and unequal nature of the relationship. Mainstream international relations theory tends to portray hegemony in a predominantly positive light, emphasizing leadership, provision of public goods, and stability.106 The idea of the tributary system, in contrast, lays bare the inequality of the relationship by its very vocabulary. China thrived on that inequality and the rituals that affirmed it. The United States, however, is understandably more conflicted: inequality, manifested in the desire for recognition of US superiority, seems at odds with the self-understanding of a nation whose Declaration of Independence begins with ‘All men are created equal’.

The tributary idea, in other words, emphasizes hierarchy and inequality in ways that the notion of hegemony seeks to dissipate. Which concept fits better with America’s relationship vis-à-vis the ROW, I leave it to the reader’s judgment. Note, however, that while hierarchy in and of itself may have negative connotations or seems at odds with the notion of ‘sovereign equality’, it is presumed to have stabilizing effects by a veritable lineage of international relations scholarship. Hegemonic stability theory suggests that hegemons play a crucial role in underwriting the economic and security order by providing the public goods that lesser states are incapable or unwilling to ante up to.107 To be sure the hegemon also reaps huge all round gains.108 David Kang argues that Chinese hegemony during the Ming and Qing periods brought the region five centuries of peace and stability.109 William Wohlforth makes the case that US unipolarity is likely to last a generation and that it is also conducive to peace and stability.110 East and Southeast Asians who welcome American hegemony in their region might also be subscribing to a ‘hegemony is conducive to peace and stability’ line of thought than to balance of power principles.

The second novelty inspired by the tributary idea is the focus on ‘tribute’—if you recognize my pole position, what should you be doing when we meet and when we are far apart? China’s answer was: let me decide if you can visit (and how frequently), kowtow to the emperor when you come to pay tribute, and allow me to invest you with the legitimacy to rule; and finally, emulate our cultural forms when you are back home. Those who bought into the system reaped substantial economic and security benefits. Viewing the United States as the hub of the tributary system provides similar insights about what it would expect from its tributaries: acknowledge its superior power by not contesting it and by allowing it bases and places; play by US rules of the economic game, and emulate American political ideas and forms. The economic and security payoffs for the secondary states are as great as those garnered by China’s major tributaries.

Finally, viewing America as the fountainhead of a tributary system connects many of the most interesting—hitherto disparate—dots that constitute the landscape of American diplomacy: hegemon, leader of the free world, democracy (promotion), prestige/status, and credibility. These self-understandings and concerns have featured prominently as key factors impacting on US foreign policy, but there does not exist a narrative that connects them in a coherent way. The tributary idea connects them and sees these elements as essential parts of the (tributary) system. Hegemony needs a legitimating discourse to justify the hierarchy and inequality and while the extant literature hones in on the provision of public goods, it neglects the politics: democracy and leadership (of the free world). What is really distinctive about the US legitimation discourse is the fusion of the two: how democracy and US leadership are joined, as in the term leader of the free world. The latter accords the United States a moral status, prestige, and credibility that are critical ingredients in maintaining the tributary system. When the epicenter is perceived to be unrivalled on these qualities, tributaries will want to edge closer to the epicenter for protection (and prestige by association) and adversaries will think twice before challenging it. It is only in understanding how seriously the United States takes that leadership role that prestige and credibility become central concerns that must be protected in the overall scheme of things.

In a piece for The Atlantic as the Cold War was winding to an end, John Lewis Gaddis proposed characterizing the period from 1945 to 1989 as The Long Peace. ‘Change the name’, Gaddis wrote, ‘and you change the thing’.111 By the latter he meant that the very speech-act of naming it a ‘Cold War’, imparts a negative take on how we view and understand the period, perhaps making us less able to discern the positive developments. Viewing it as the Long Peace, in contrast, should dispose us to better understand, and perhaps preserve, the elements that sustained that peace. This article has sought to introduce a new vocabulary to view the way the United States relates to the ROW. Its distinctive contributions consist in introducing the (Chinese) tributary idea as a framework for analyzing US foreign policy and in fleshing out the parallels suggested by the framework in a preliminary way.

We began by observing how America and China’s approach to international relations have unrecognized similarities. Perhaps it is appropriate to end by commenting on an underappreciated difference. In his superb analysis of the Chinese world order and how it collapsed in the face of Western pressures, Yongjin Zhang honed in on a vocabulary change that revealed China’s existential dilemma after the mid-19th century: China’s sense of its place in the world shrank from ‘tianxia’ (all under heaven) to ‘guojia’ (a state), i.e. ‘the Chinese world became a China in the world’.112 Using the tributary lens to illuminate the longue duree of American diplomacy leads one to a rather different conclusion about America’s foreign policy trajectory in the 20th and 21st centuries: the United States’ place in the world seems to have moved from ‘guojia’ to ‘tianxia’. The term that most of us have used until now to describe that trajectory and state of affairs is the Pax Americana. Could that be a euphemism for the American tributary system?

How time flies…

Our history grad students were presenting historiographical surveys of their major research papers to the members of the history graduate faculty. One paper was about the representation of the Vietnam War in comic books of the time. It turned out that I was the only person in the room who remembered the Vietnam War. Man, that was fast!

A student working on that project made the statement that it was one of the most important events in American history. I said, "Really? I was around back then and I don't think so. Yes it was important, but it was no Compromise of 1850."

Much mirth resulted.

You will wait in vain for a historian of modern times to make such a good witticism about the Middle Ages.


Image: John Brown at Harpers Ferry.

According to my impression, the best of the other poetry

	With a faithful heart and with a humble attitude I come towards Love to show the grievous ills I have suffered, great and extraordinary, for the sweet smile and amorous semblance my lady gave me when we first exchanged glances when she took my heart and my faithful thoughts and I put myself under her rich suzerainty.
	To you, O Love, I want to show, by singing, how my lady took me, and why, and with which aids and where I, Love’s faithful and loyal servant, stand. I have little good: captured and wretched, I have been held, without any regards, not merely a year but, in truth, believe me, it will be seven years when the leaves sprout again.
	Sweetly, Love, she came before me displaying, in her eyes, joyous and perfect expressions of mercy; for there is no man born of woman who can sway my devotion because of the smile she gave me, which was so sweet that I believed she would soon have mercy on me: but having believed that, I admit, was foolish.
	For I chose her, according to my impression, as the best of the other royals, and she has held my heart among her possessions with her rich virtue, which outshines the others': just as the Sun, above all other radiance gives us clarity, I can say equally that she is clarity and gives radiance.
	The sweet awareness of her beautiful shapely body much worsens my pains and my ills, which make my eyes used to weeping for her beauty, which is before me all day: and her looks thus kill me in my imagination, for I know she has simply killed me unless she gives me her heart in short order.
	Well, then, Love, do this at least: be my peer in good will and force my lady, at the very least, to approve, and show me she approves that I love her more than any living being; and you'll have made me joyous and happy when I have been taken as her liege.
	Go quickly, song, to My Desire, and tell her, if she likes, through her choice, to find it good that I love her with all my desire. Cadenet, Canso 1, adapted